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Abstract. In this paper, we will suggest that social work needs to recover its connection to the Aristotelian ethical
tradition wherein, to be «virtuous» is a «practice». Virtue ethics, we argue, is holistic. It implies a strength of
character within the polity. No one can live a good life by focusing only on a single «virtue» or dimension of
character. Social work is a complex practice through which not only the client but the practitioner will be enhanced
or transformed. In spite of the Kantian emphasis on duty, the behaviorists emphasis on «behavior», the professional
association’s emphasis on «codes» to control misconduct, and more recently the emphasis on risk management
in social agencies, social work is still a «calling», a moral enterprise wherein excellence depends on the character
traits or virtues of the practitioner. The article suggests paths for incorporating virtue ethics in the curriculum.
Keywords: Virtue ethics; Social Work practice; professional codes; Aristotelian principles.
[es] Trabajo Social contemporáneo, formación y práctica: una llamada 
a la revisión de la ética de la virtud
Resumen ampliado. Este artículo sugiere que el Trabajo Social tiene que recuperar su conexión con la tradición
ética aristotélica, según la cual ser virtuoso es una práctica.
En la introducción se apunta que el Trabajo Social es una práctica compleja para la mejora y transformación no
sólo de la persona que es objeto de intervención, sino también del o de la profesional.
La autora parte de que el Trabajo Social, a pesar del énfasis conductista en el comportamiento, del de las asocia-
ciones profesionales que se refleja en los códigos para vigilar las malas prácticas profesionales, y recientemen-
te, del énfasis en la gestión de casos en las instituciones sociales, sigue estando llamado a cumplir una empresa
moral en la que una buena intervención profesional depende de la personalidad o la virtud del profesional. A par-
tir de ello, se plantean los siguientes aspectos:
1. La ética de la virtud y la práctica del Trabajo Social
2. Los códigos éticos y la práctica basada en la virtud
3. La formación ética y el Trabajo Social
4. Las implicaciones para la formación en Trabajo Social
Con respecto a la ética de la virtud y la práctica autores, como Beauchamp y Childress (1994), distinguen la vir-
tud intelectual de la virtud moral. Una virtud intelectual es un rasgo de la personalidad que es valorado socialmen-
te. Una virtud moral es un rasgo de la personalidad que se valora moralmente. Por ejemplo, la amabilidad, la fru-
galidad o la puntualidad son rasgos de carácter que se valoran socialmente, mientras que la honestidad, la generosidad,
la humildad y la caridad son virtudes que se valoran moralmente. Esto no quiere decir que una virtud valorada so-
cialmente no pueda serlo también moralmente. En el Trabajo Social, por ejemplo, las virtudes no pueden ser sim-
plemente dimensiones morales abstractas, sino que deben ser hábitos derivados de la toma de decisiones en el ejer-
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Introduction
In an implicit critique of the current codes of
ethics of professional social work orga-
nizations, Webb (2006) defined the «practice
of value» as stressing «the importance of
caring, virtue and recognition as antidotes to
extreme individualism» (p. 18). This thinking,
most would recognize, is based on the Aris-
totelian tradition. For Aristotle, the good life
was a happy and virtuous life in the fullest
meaning of the phrase. A full life was grounded
on the reality that surrounds us — rather than
on the Platonic world of ideas. A full life
included the moral virtues, which, for Aris-
totle, are midway points between two extre-
mes each of which is a vice, an excess or a
deficiency (Magee, 2006; Hinman, 2013).
The selection of Aristotelian philosophy in a
social work discussion is very natural. Social
work is a practical endeavor, grounded on the
world that surrounds us. As a philosopher,
Aristotle was able to blend and interest in
philosophy with an interest in science and
research. He also believed, as do social wor-
kers, that happiness, not just duty, should be
one of the guiding principles of human flour-
ishing. «Aristotle’s desire to know about the
world of experience was like an unshakable
lust. Throughout his life he poured himself
into research with gargantuan passion and
energy across an almost incredibly wide
range» (Magee, 2006, p. 32).
Among Aristotle’s classical virtues, ex-
tremely helpful in social work, are gene-
rosity, defined as the «mean between profli-
cicio y la práctica profesional a lo largo de los años; de este modo se indica que las prácticas y virtudes de las y los
profesionales, al trabajar en las comunidades, calan en las personas con las que entran en contacto.
En lo que se refiere al segundo aspecto, se plantea que es un hecho la tendencia actual a codificar las conductas en
documentos y códigos cuasi-legales que tratan de la práctica profesional. Los códigos profesionales, en general,
ofrecen guías útiles para ayudar a los profesionales en un mundo de enormes dilemas, pero al mismo tiempo pue-
den convertirse en elementos de rigidez para la práctica profesional. Por ello, en este artículo se critican algunas
teorías, como el conductismo, por considerar que tiende a ser estrechas y mecanicistas en la formas de respuesta
profesional. Mientras que la ética de la virtud va más allá de las respuestas mecanicistas, hay una sutileza en la
práctica que implica reflexión y compromiso. También se plantea que uno de los problemas de la implantación de
la gestión de casos (o gestión del riesgo), que es muy común en la actualidad, es el hecho de que es más prescrip-
tivo que dialógico. El estudiante o el profesional neófito no tienen la oportunidad de reflexionar y preguntarse pos-
teriormente cuál podría ser la mejor decisión en la intervención que van a realizar. La decisión está prescrita, por
lo que ciertamente supone menos riesgo, pero mayor rigidez en la respuesta a problemas complejos.
El tercer epígrafe defiende que el desarrollo de las virtudes es comparable con el desarrollo de la utilización de
los sentidos y, por lo tanto, la formación se convierte en un elemento clave. Pero el tipo de formación que se con-
sidera prioritario es el de la supervisión y, por ello, se aboga por retomar la función de la supervisión que ha sido
un pilar fundamental en la tradición del Trabajo Social. A través de la supervisión, la o el profesional debe refle-
xionar y analizar los pros y contras de una determinada acción. Se insiste en que uno de los problemas actuales
de la formación en Trabajo Social es la disminución de la confianza en la supervisión y, por lo tanto, se han per-
dido los aspectos de reflexión sustantiva y significativa sobre la actuación práctica.
Por último, en las implicaciones de la ética de la virtud en Trabajo Social, la autora se muestra optimista con el
retorno a la ética de la virtud como un tema de discusión en Trabajo Social, ya que representa un cambio impor-
tante para quienes creen que la profesión se basa en la fuerza de la personalidad de sus profesionales. Por ello,
los futuros trabajadores sociales deben ser animados a reflexionar sobre los aspectos éticos de los problemas a
los que tienen que enfrentarse, lo que conllevará un «entrenamiento» moral que les permitirá realizar aquellos
juicios morales que implique la práctica de la intervención social.
Palabras clave: Virtudes éticas; prácticas de Trabajo Social; códigos profesionales; principios aristotélicos.
Summary: Introduction. 1. Virtue Ethics and Social Work Practice. 2. Codes of Ethics and Practice Ba-
sed on Virtues. 3. Ethics and Social Work Education. 4. Implications for Social Work Education. 5. Refe-
rences.
Cómo citar: Martínez-Brawley, E. (2017) Contemporary Social Work pracrtice and education: a call for a re-exa-
mination of virtue ethics, en Cuad. trab. soc. 30(1), 109-118.
Martínez-Brawley, E.; Zorita, M-B. Cuad. trab. soc. 30(1) 2017: 109-118 111
gacy and meanness»; justice and prudence,
always associated with wisdom; courage,
«between foolhardiness and cowardice» (p.
38), and self-respect, «between vanity and self-
abasement» (Magee, 2006, p. 38). In other
words, a full life includes the practice of the
«golden mean.» Our selection of Aristotle and
the virtues as a focal point in this discussion
does not imply a rejection of the ethical tra-
ditions of the Enlightenment, including the
British utilitarian philosophers, who are se-
minal in understanding the basis of Ame-
rican pragmatism in social work practice, and
its curriculum.
According to MacIntyre (1984), Webb
(2006), Barsky and others, practice and
consequently social work practice is intrin-
sically related to character. Therefore, the
moral dimensions of the worker matter. Prac-
titioners «encapsulate virtue in their pro-
fessional personae. They are not moral
thinkers, but moral agents and beings»
(Barsky 2010, n/p). Barsky further suggests
that virtuous people are not simply motivated
by rules or the fear of punishment but they
act ethically because they are internally
driven to do so.
When McBeath and Webb (2002), or
Barsky (2010), or Webster (2011) or many
others suggest a resurgence of «virtue ethics»
in social work practice, they are referring to
a fundamental paradigm change or a return
to an ancient and long established tradition
of helping and caring. For Webb (2006),
virtue ethics is:
A normative theory according to which all
moral value is derived from the character of
moral agents. In emphasizing a person’s
character and the way they [sic] reach jud-
gements, it is often seen as running contrary to
rule-bound, duty-bound or guiding conceptions
of moral principles (...). Virtue ethics empha-
sizes an aesthetic of existence by stressing the
importance of achieving a meaningful life
(p. 22).
In this paper, we will suggest that social
work needs to recover its connection to the
Aristotelian ethical tradition wherein, to be
«virtuous is a practice (...). It requires judge-
ment of what is a just measure of action
commensurable with the situation» (McBeath
& Webb, 2002, p. 1022). The practice of virtue
ethics, as has been suggested, by many recent
social work thinkers is measured action.
1. Virtue Ethics and Social Work Practice
Virtue ethics, in the Aristotelian tradition, is
holistic. It implies a strength of character
within the polity. No one can live a good life
by focusing only on a single «virtue» or di-
mension of character. The virtuous character
interweaves those attributes that are appro-
priate to achieving or living in a particular
way, without touching the extremes. Conse-
quently, based on virtue ethics, a generous
practitioner will weigh or judge an appro-
priate point between profligacy and meanness.
A courageous one will not advise foolhardy
risk taking but neither would he/she suggest
cowardice. This is what in general social
workers have done in their practice. As Murphy
(1999) suggested, «virtue requires balance
rather than being “holier than thou” or taking
any quality to the extreme.» (p. 123).
In relation to the issue of balance and its
counterpart, good judgement in professional
practice, it is of interest to review MacIntyre’s
(1984) definition of practice. For MacIntyre,
practice is «a coherent and complex form of
socially established, cooperative human acti-
vity. The goods internal to that form of activity
are realized in the achieving of the standards
of excellence which are appropriate and
partially definitive of that form of activity
(...)» (p. 187, slightly edited). To illustrate the
matter on a very light vein, MacIntyre remarks
that planting turnips is not a practice but that
farming is. Farming is holistic and artistic in
nature; it is inspirational and embedded in a
way of thinking and a tradition that respects
the earth at the same time that it uses it; that
thinks about the consequences of planting as
well as about the product itself; that uses
judgement rather than prescription in decision
making. In a practice that depends on virtue
ethics, it is not only that the practice will result
in excellence but also that the practitioner will
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be enhanced or transformed. One can become
a technically excellent piano player without
ever achieving the status of «virtuoso», who
enhances not only the audience but himself/ 
herself with each performance. For excellence
means doing one’s best but it also means being
transformed by the practice.
It is important to note that for MacIntyre
(1984) excellence can only be realized within
a practice community and in the case of social
work, it could be said that the cannons and
traditions of the profession give the practice
of moral reasoning guidance and direction.
As Kallenberg (1997) put it, «human life is
for living in resonance with our community’s
stockpile of stories about moral heroes» (p.
364). Thomas Chalmers, Jane Addams, Mary
Richmond, Bertha Reynolds, and many others
can offer such examples. For Meara, et al.
(1996), the ideals and virtues are set forth as
standards or goals for the professionals and
are expectations held by the public, for which,
if not upheld, the professionals can be cri-
ticized (p.26).
As a starting point, virtue ethics in the
social work profession is not necessarily
required of the client but definitely of the
professional. The professional is the one
expected to develop character and the virtues
contingent to it. Beauchamp and Childress
(1994) distinguish an intellectual virtue from
a moral virtue. An intellectual virtue is a trait
of character that is socially valued, and
generalizable within the context of a whole
community. A moral virtue is a trait of cha-
racter that is morally valued. For example,
graciousness, thriftiness, punctuality are all
traits of character that are socially valued while
honesty, generosity, humility and charity are
virtues that are morally valued. That is not to
say that a socially valued «virtue» cannot also
be morally valued. In social work, for example,
virtues cannot just be abstract moralistic
dimensions but should be habits derived from
intellectual and practical decision-making
through the years. Because professionals are
agents within communities, their practices and
virtues permeate the people they contact. The
virtues of the professional illuminate the
behavior of the client. Most social work virtues
are also socially valued. As Bellah, et al. (1985)
put it in the title of his book, they are Habits
of the Heart.
The practice of virtue ethics, whether in
art or social work, is attached or dependent on
an agent. The social worker or the artist who
embodies the virtues will offer examples of
the good life. It is the agent, the social worker,
who must develop and show justice, prudence,
moderation, etc. It is the social worker who
must illustrate for the client how these virtues
can be practiced and can attain the desired
results. In the same way that a master painter
shows his student how color can create pic-
tures and emotions, the social work artist can
evoke the appropriate emotions and cause
change in the client. The artist does not just
apply techniques mechanistically, but brings
to bear the dimensions of his/her character
intrinsic to the practice. The true artist may
know the rules of painting but is not enslaved
by them. He/she has learned from the past and
has accepted traditions proved useful without
making them the only path. The virtuous social
worker respects, for example, practice wisdom,
the cumulative accomplishments of the pro-
fessional past but uses prudence in its appli-
cation. The virtues are inspiring and guiding
rather than prescriptive. The virtuous social
worker knows the principles of the practice
but is not always bound by them. He/she con-
fronts a situation and uses practical experien-
ce, reflection and circumspection in making
virtuous decisions. This capacity for change
through good judgement explains how in
Aristotle’s time slavery may have been con-
doned but in today’ polity will not. The ele-
ments of practical experience, reflection and
circumspection are an integral part of the
holistic view of a practice based on virtue
ethics. They are also elements of the art of
social work. Payne (2002) states:
Any situation may need us to develop and
change our guidelines, responding to new
aspects of the work and social circumstances
that we meet. We must look underneath the
surface relationship and events which are
presented to us. At any time we may need to
think again and think differently. Because this
kind of flexibility is the essence of dealing
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with any human being and being effective
(p. 126).
2. Codes of Ethics and Practice Based on
Virtues
In today’s world of codification, duty and risk
management— (an ethos Kant would have
appreciated), the integrative and moderating
aspects of virtue ethics are an added bonus
for practice. A social worker whether or not
practicing virtue ethics, knows he/she should
be guided by a code. Typically, it is the pro-
fessional code of the country’s association but
the social worker cannot be inflexible in
adhering to it. Take for example, autonomy.
The virtuous social worker knows that accord-
ing to the code, client autonomy should be
respected. The practitioner, however should
assess when and how far. The social worker
who reflects or even counsels a client on a bad
time to take a particular decision (e.g.: get
married or change a job) is using prudence to
moderate his/her respect for autonomy. The
moment the social worker enters into such
conversations with a client, he/she is using
prudence in relation to autonomous behavior.
Another case in point is confidentiality. In
most situations, confidentiality as a rule
binding principle must be tempered by the
specific situations. There is always a judge-
ment call involved for the worker. An obvious
example in the U.S.A. relates to child welfare
practice and the issue of «duty to report». The
legal mandate trumps confidentiality but even
if it did not exist, the social worker would be
faced with a prudential decision on the
meaning and extent of confidentiality. The
application of any principle cannot be me-
chanistic. The examples just cited have
implications not only for professional practi-
ce but also for social work education for it is
in that process that the development of
character and the habits related to virtue
ethics will occur.
Discussing the development of professional
ethics, Bright et al. (2014) offer a brief
historical review that is very applicable to the
development of codes of ethics in social work.
By the 19th century, the virtue and cha-
racter- focused approach had fallen out of
favor, particularly in scientifically oriented
secular circles. In Victorian England, the term
«virtue» had lost much of its original meaning...
coming to more narrowly connote a life of
chastity or abstinence. In the early 20th century,
as the social sciences rose in prominence, there
was an explicit effort to suppress considera-
tions of virtue-oriented perspectives (...) be-
cause of perceived concerns about maintaining
the secular, objective values of the scientific
method (p. 447).
In the U.S.A, after the Flexner critique of
social work of 1915, the profession worried
not only about its secular nature, but also
about de-coupling the «ought to» implied in
the Kantian tradition of moral duty from the
objective reality of social work. However, as
we have said, there is no contradiction between
a «moral» virtue and a socially valued cha-
racter trait or «virtue» even if it is called duty.
MacIntyre (1984) argued that there was no
division between the «ought to» and the re-
quirements of excellence in the practice of
social work. It has been well recognized, as
Adams (2009) suggested, that «social work
as a profession has a telos in that it serves
primarily the good and well-being of the
client, as the good of the patient is agreed to
be the primary end and telos of medicine» (p.
91). The raison d’etre of social work, which
is the commitment to the welfare of others,
has been found to echo not only the Judeo-
Christian traditions of the West but also the
ancient philosophies of the East, whether
Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, or others.
But traditions alone do not appear to be
enough in modern times. In discussing codes
and virtue ethics, we must recognize the in-
fluence of the Kantian categorical imperative
primarily in the development of professional
codes in the English speaking world. The
central role of duty in ethics was an important
theme of Enlightenment ethics but the duty
bound philosophy of Kant has been criticized
for ignoring that a well-developed inner cha-
racter can be a forceful foundation for the
good life. For Kant, you do your duty because
you must, not because your inner voice tells
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you but because a universal law tells you so.
Duty is disengaged from character. The pers-
pective of value ethics is that the professional
does well for others and the client not only
because he/she «must» but because of «who»
he/she is.
It is a fact that the tendency of modernity
has been to codify behaviors into quasi-legal
documents and codes that address professional
practice at the same time that they offer
guidelines—oftentimes rigid ones— for the
enforcement of sanctions. The NASW Code
of Ethics as well as the many others that
followed its model have played and often
emphasized such a role. However, it must be
remembered that, as Reid and Billups (1986)
state, «the current code of ethics does not
constitute a system of thought that is appli-
cable as a tool of [ethical] analysis... for the
typical sort of problems that social workers
face» (p. 7). Other authors have agreed with
this perspective. Reamer (1982) has also
argued that the code is of limited value in
guiding the actions of practitioners when
confronted with an ethical dilemma. Rather,
professional codes generally offer useful
guideposts to help professionals in a world of
daunting dilemmas. As Adams (2009) has
described, «the collapse in the twentieth
century of the most widely used and longest
lasting [code]... that of Hippocrates, suggests
both the difficulty of the task and the need to
rebuild the moral philosophy of the pro-
fessions on a different basis (p. 91). In other
words, modern times require the social
worker to move beyond the code.
This leads us back to contrasting virtue
ethics in practice with other contemporary
approaches such as behaviorism. Professional
virtues are not present only as enforcers of
behavior but as merits of the person’s character
in his/her own right. As Bright et al. (2014)
commented, «from a virtue ethics perspec-
tive» a behaviorally based account of virtue is
a weak theory of virtue» (p. 445). Behaviorism
in the strictness sense proposes the Skinnerian
principle of behavior is what behavior does;
it tends to be narrow and mechanistic. While
virtues might be manifested in behavior, they
go beyond mechanistic responses; there is a
subtlety in the practice that implies reflection,
commitment and a calling to care. When
virtues have been apprehended by the practi-
tioner, the professional is truthful not because
of potential sanctions but because of his/her
personal commitment to truthfulness. This is
not to deny that regulations or codes do not
play a role in the formation and refinement of
character, but they are not necessarily a subs-
titute for character. Holmstrom (2013) argued
that a focus upon the moral character of the
professional can be heightened through regu-
latory changes. Nevertheless, in his assessment
of current concerns, the focus should be less
upon competence or conduct but more upon
the inner character of the individual or what
is generally understood as a virtue ethics
perspective.
The current call for a reinstatement of a
more holistic approach based on virtue ethics
is not related to a rejection of duty but rather
based on an awareness that many of the pro-
blems faced by practitioners are not answered
solely by rules, regulations, mandates or codes
of behavior but rather by careful reflection of
positions that in essence represent the virtues
between deficiency and excess. If anything
can be said about the pitfalls of current risk
management practices, for example, is that
every action of the practitioner is regulated by
actuarial principles of risk calculation leaving
very little room for the practitioner’s use of
his/her own moral compass. The character of
the professional appears to be always in
question giving the impression that emphasis
has not been placed on its development.
3. Ethics and Social Work Education
Having discussed the importance of character
in social work, the selection of novices for the
profession, that is, of candidates for programs,
should be associated with an assessment of
the applicant’s capacity to develop virtues that
result in integrity and flexibility of character.
To quote McBeath and Webb (2002):
The development of the virtues is rather
like the development of the use of the senses.
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We have an inborn capacity to use our senses
but we can still be trained to use them effec-
tively. We can be given guidance as to how we
might see things better if we stand here rather
than there and so on (p. 1031).
In the struggle for defining virtue among
virtue ethicists, the Aristotelian guiding
principle of a virtue being the point between
extremes is quite compelling. As Houston
suggests in a recent critique, virtue ethicists
point us to the development of moral intuition,
of looking deeply within ourselves and exa-
mining our intentions, for then we will «hear
the small voice that tells us what is right»
(Houston, 2003, p. 820). Most virtue ethicist
concur that our moral compasses require
training in the same way that appreciating art
requires tutoring. Kallenberg (1997) states:
I want to suggest that the practice of moral
reasoning or ethics, requires the same sort of
tutored struggle as one’s induction into the
practice of art appreciation. All of us require
our moral taste to be cultivated and our moral
eyesight sharpened. Thus, a course in ethics
ought to aim at changing precisely these
aspects of our character. But, be forewarned
there are no shortcuts on this journey (p. 362).
Most authors agree that virtues in social
work, though probably easily identif iable
through practical reasoning, have not received
a great deal of attention.
Practical reasoning is something that we
undertake from within our shared mode of
practice by asking, when we have good reason
to do so, what the strongest and soundest
objections are to this or that particular belief
or concept that we have up to this point taken
for granted (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 157)
In academic terms, the Socratic method of
meaningful dialogue between the master
artisan and the novice can then be followed.
The role of the supervisor or mentor, in sound
social work tradition, becomes pivotal. A
learner must reflect and then inquire the
merits and de-merits of a particular action
within the community’s tradition. One of the
problems of social work education today is
that the reliance on the wise mentor or much
practiced supervisor has decreased and thus
the lessons of substantial and meaningful
practical reasoning have been lost.
We can be shown how to judge and we
come to realize that this basic virtue can be
used in any number of cases. This is a dialo-
gical enterprise with peers and supervisors
alike, not to find out how this case could have
been handled better but to explore how one
might go about thinking, judging, reasoning,
reflecting, imagining, feeling about the aspects
of social work (McBeath and Webb, 2002,
p. 1031).
One of the problems of risk management
which is prevalent today is the fact that it is
prescriptive rather than dialogic. The student
or novice does not have the opportunity to
reflect and then ask what might be the best
direction to take. The direction is prescribed by
what is the least risky. But risk calculations do
not always represent the greatest wisdom or are
embedded in the greatest virtues of the pro-
fession.
Social work education has been focusing
primarily on the intellectual capacity and
potential academic success of the practitioner.
But Holmstrom, for example argues that «it is
now timely to refocus upon the character of
student social workers» (p. 452). Such a focus,
she believes, is not competing with intellectual
perspective but takes it into account together
with sound judgment and wisdom. If a future
social worker is selected with the idea that
character is an important component of the
training, training will make character a «stable
reference point» for the practitioner. «This is
not to deny the importance of outcomes for
individuals or organizations, for clearly, virtue
or character alone is not sufficient for effective
social work practice. Further, rules and princi-
ple remain important given the fact that not all
practitioners will become virtuous» (p. 454).
4. Implications for Social Work Education
One of the current issues of social work
training in the U.S.A is the emphasis on the
generating of numbers of registrants in many
social work programs in academic institutions.
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The economics of social work training tend to
be more favorable to institutions than the
economics of training, for example, of other
health related professions such as nursing,
which are by far more expensive. This has
tended to encourage administrative leaders to
take short cuts in relation to the most impor-
tant aspects of character formation and con-
sequently, to raise among professors a
«righteous ire» about even bothering selecting
with care the applicants to the programs.
Additionally, with open admissions, many
programs cannot or do not select applicants
based on criteria other than grade point
average. Interviews preceding admission are
often non-existent; careful mentoring in
beginning courses, where character traits can
be cultivated more than technological learning
are cut short, and finally, field supervision,
the true test of acquired «virtues» is left often
to chance. These aspects have always been
central to professional training in social work
and they remain so if we are to cultivate virtue
ethics among new recruits.
There is also the issue of understanding
an assessing character. Identifying character
to be developed is not the same as offering
arbitrary judgments on part of selection
committees. When faced with people who are
diverse and might reveal their character traits
in many different ways, selection committees
cannot rely on simplistic or naïve under-
standings of virtues. This has been a challeng-
ing issue in social work, particularly because
a commitment to diverse populations is part
of the core of the profession and committees
are concerned about making erroneous
judgements. Candidates reveal the virtue of
compassion or a zeal for justice in different
ways. Those responsible for making selec-
tions rely on the «mean», but we know that
even Aristotle’s «golden mean» (though the
virtuous point between extremes), has been
criticized for its allegiance to the status quo.
Change often requires exaggerated passion,
which calls upon another virtue, courage or
fortitude, and in some instance, can over-ride
prudence. This situation, in Webster’s (2011)
terms should lead educators to develop a
model «that stresses character» and relies on
virtues, that is, is cognizant of the seminal
Aristotelian four: prudence, justice, tempe-
rance and fortitude, remembering that this is
not a hierarchy of virtues, but rather, a
composition. Not all cardinal virtues will
have the same importance all of the times.
One or another will be salient according to a
reasoned assessment of the action required.
If we use reason well, we live well as
human beings; or, to be more precise, using
reason well over the course of a full life is what
happiness (flourishing) consists in. Doing
anything well requires virtue or excellence,
and therefore living well consists in activities
caused by the rational soul in accordance with
virtue (Kraut, 2007, p. 4).
The return to virtue ethics as a topic of
discussion in social work represents a wel-
come change for those who believe the
profession was built on the strength of the
character of its exemplary practitioners.
Schools of Social Work in particular need to
spend time discussing with their applicants
some of the classic questions social workers
encounter. Applicants should be encouraged
to ponder on: How do I expect to fulfil the
ethical calling social workers in history felt?».
We have suggested that our moral compass
requires training. Reflections on these ques-
tions develop into a form of moral training
and practice in making moral judgements that
each professor and mentor, not just those who
teach practice related subjects must attend to.
Schools of Social Work will find that
students are varied in their motivations to enter
the profession. While some of them will be
technically inclined, many more will want to
right the wrongs they see around them and
render to individuals their due rights. In other
words, they are called by a form of virtue ethics
in which justice is preponderant. It is apparent
that social work education could follow many
paths in the re-calling of virtue ethics as a
curricular theme. One would be to capitalize
on righteous indignation of professors and
novices as a way to enter the ethical dialogue.
Another path would be to capture the students’
and professors’ sense of generosity or mag-
nanimity and even another develop patience
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(temperance and moderation) as virtues in
solving problems in social work practice.
Inevitably, if these paths were to be followed at
the start, the curriculum and the instructional
processes will center on the virtuous life, on
the inter-relatedness of the cardinal virtues. For
Aristotle the aim was always to achieve a rich
and balanced. In the same way, for the social
worker embedded in virtue ethics, the goal is
to arrive at the good life, at eudiamonia or
happiness for worker and client through mov-
ing towards worthy ends.
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